ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Legal writers often complain about the form of legal discourse to the point where seemingly inconsequential esoterica receive the passionate scrutiny of the well-intentioned analyst. 1 But introductory signals-which may be the epitome of form-draw considerable fire for good reason: they are often poorly defined, prompting both inconsistent usage and great confusion. The [Espinosa] opinion cited only a single case, Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 382 (1985) , in support of its central conclusion that indirect weighing of an invalid aggravator "creates the same potential for arbitrariness" as direct weighing of an invalid aggravator. And it introduced that lone citation with a "cf."-an introductory signal which shows authority that supports the point in dictum or by analogy, not one that "controls" or "dictates" the result. 15 Baldwin, however, arguably did establish that the Court's ruling in Espinosa was not an unprecedented leap of reason. 16 Curiously, neither of the two Lambrix dissents defended the citation to Baldwin.
The fact that Espinosa introduced Baldwin with a cf. signal helps explain why the Lambrix majority failed to analyze potentially contradictory Supreme Court statements concerning the novelty of the principle it propounded. As exemplified in Lambrix, cf. citations are frequently used but rarely, if ever, explained. Moreover, they are often viewed with skepticism. One observer has even speculated that 10. See id. at 518. 11. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) . 12. See id. at 310. 13. 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992) (per curiam) ("[A]n aggravating circumstance is invalid in this sense if its description is so vague as to leave the sentencer without sufficient guidance for determining the presence or absence of the factor. We have held instructions more specific and elaborate than the one given in the instant case unconstitutionally vague.").
14. See Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 539-40. 15. Id. at 529 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Espinosa, 505 U.S. at 1082). 16. The Baldwin Court stated that a defendant's argument "conceivably might have merit if the judge actually were required to consider the jury's 'sentence' as a recommendation as to the sentence the jury believed would be appropriate, and if the judge were obligated to accord some deference to it." Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 382 (1985) (citation omitted). The Espinosa case originated in Florida, a state that requires its judges "to pay deference to a jury's sentencing recommendation." Espinosa, 505 U.S. at 1082. Intriguingly, the Baldwin Court itself cited Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) , with a cf. signal to support the first sentence quoted above. See Baldwin, 472 U.S. at 382.
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legal writers use the cf. signal when they wish to impress the reader with the breadth of their research. 17 For those who have not read or had experience with the citation rules, the process of interpreting such carelessly used citations can be either exasperating or completely cryptic. 18 Expert legal writers often fare no better, and many have found fault with the use and misuse of the cf. signal. 19 Eminent jurist Robert Bork, for example, offered the following reprobation: "As the majority presumably recognized, since it cited [a prior decision] with a cf., the case is probably inapposite." 20 What, then, is the true value of the cf. signal? This Article attempts to answer that question from a semiotic perspective, examining how the cf. signal may operate in both theory and practice.
In Part I, this Article presents a history of the meaning and use of the cf. signal, with particular reference to semiotics as a theoretical construct through which to evaluate it. Part II takes this theoretical construct and applies it to a variety of judicial decisions that use and analyze the cf. citation. In addition, Part II highlights the spectrum of cf. decisions, and the implications of the ambiguity and contradiction in the use of this signal. Finally, Part III integrates theory and judicial practice and proposes an approach to cf. usage that should lead to greater clarity and understanding. 17 . See Lushing, supra note 2, at 601 ("Use cf. when you've wasted your time reading the case.").
18. See FREDERICK BERNAYS WEINER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS 223 (2d ed. 1961) (describing introductory signals as "a virtually cryptographic code"); Coombs, supra note 2, at 1110 (" [T] he standard citations forms have the virtue of using linguistic ambiguity to avoid confronting delicate theoretical or political issues.").
19. The quarrels are often quite contentious. See Czerkies v. United States Dep't of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435, 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("Rodrigues gave 
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I. SEMIOTICS, THE ROLE OF SIGNALS, AND THE Cf. CITATION: HAZY DEFINITIONS, CLEAR FUNCTIONS
A. Analogical Reasoning and the Problem of Cf. Definition
Few readers of law journals require an education in the meaning of reasoning by analogy. Both law students and judges (as well as many lawyers) engage in the process daily. Suffice it to say for present purposes, therefore, that, in every case necessitating the application of law to fact, the judge must determine the extent to which existing precedent governs the instant case. If the court deems the precedent to be "close," the court will treat the precedent either as controlling or as influential and apply it to the case accordingly. If, on the other hand, the court focuses on one or more factors to distinguish existing precedent, then the court will either have to find closer precedent or treat the case as one of first impression and formulate an appropriate rule of decision.
This notion of "closeness"-or degree of separation-is inherent in the process of analogical reasoning. Judges, through their opinions, move in interstitial ways. 21 This notion of closeness is also inherent in legal citation practice, for introductory signals "indicate the purposes for which the citations are made and the degree of support the citations give." 22 In this way, citation signals help to pave the path of the law. By helping to assign the degree of support and the strength of distinctions and reconciliations, they help to articulate the degree of departure from existing law. If the signposts are bad, so too may be the destination. We must therefore take utmost care to be true to the intended development of the law. Put differently, careless citation practice can lead to haphazard consequences that should be controlled to the extent desired and to the extent possible.
Despite the laudable goals of citation practice, the cf. signal is viewed with skepticism. One reason is that practical definitions and uses of the signal vary widely. The Bluebook authors explicitly grant 21. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions."); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103 (1921) ("We must keep within those interstitial limits which precedent and custom and the long and silent and almost indefinable practice of other judges through the centuries of the common law have set to judge-made innovations.").
22. BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1. "Cf." is used to introduce any authority which supports a statement, conclusion, or opinion of law different from that in text but sufficiently analogous to lend some support to the text. "Cf." is never used to support a statement of fact.
"Cf.," rather than "accord," is appropriate whenever a factual distinction between the text and the authority is of such legal significance that the proposition of law must be materially different. "Cf.," rather than "see," is appropriate whenever the proposition supported by the authority is not relevant directly to that advanced by text but only analogous to it.
32
The eleventh edition included an only slightly reworded version of the first sentence contained in the tenth edition, 33 and eliminated the second paragraph entirely. The thirteenth edition added a new sentence, one directly relevant to the present discussion: "The [cf.] citation's relevance will usually be clear to the reader only if it is 29. See Dickerson, supra note 2, app. C-1 at 212; id. at 67 (listing introductory signal definitions from the fifteenth and sixteenth editions of The Bluebook); id. at 55 n.1 (identifying the dates of publication for the seventh edition, which commenced the practice of defining introductory signals, and the fourteenth edition, which contained the most recent adjustment). Law journals introduced the cf. signal, which had little legal tradition prior to its introduction in the first half of the century. 42 The resulting pressure to decide more cases more quickly and to justify their rationales in writing has the capacity to lessen the precision of citations and citation practice.
B. Cf.'s Semiotic Function
From one perspective, this inquiry into the proper role of the cf. signal and its practice epitomizes the elevation of quarrels about the form of legal discourse over those concerning its substance. On the other hand, few would contend that analogical thinking is not essential to the development of law. If the function of the cf. signal relates to analogical reasoning, then the use of the signal must be accepted as an integral, organic part of legal discourse. 43 This relationship may be conveyed in terms of semiotics, the study of systems of symbols and signs that have communicative value. Semiotics, broadly defined as "the study of theories of meaning," 44 attempts to explain signals' meanings by identifying the role that they play as "signs" in legal discourse. According to 42 . See ALDISERT, supra note 40, § 1.2, at 1-2 (noting that the number of judicial opinions submitted for publication has more than doubled in the past thirty years).
43. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 843 (arguing that the study of legal citation "provide[s] entryways into people's lives and the larger culture in which they live and by which they are shaped").
44. Reed Dickerson, Toward a Legal Dialectic, 61 IND. L.J. 315, 320 (1986). When applied to the legal sphere, for example, structural semiotics demonstrates the dangerous (at least from a pedagogical perspective) circularity of defining rights and duties in relation to one another. "We might imagine, for example, a lawyer simultaneously arguing that a property owner has the right to exclude an unauthorized entrant as a trespasser and that a person seeking unauthorized access to privately held land is a trespasser because the property owner has a right to exclude others. 
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semiologists, signs are shared concepts in the form of words that take their meanings (in part) from the language system in which they operate, and together create culture. 45 Judicial opinions, for example, are signs; they draw upon facts and authorities to create rules that redefine the circumstances in which the rule will be applied. 46 Legal terms are signs as well; for example, when attorneys or students discuss the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that term represents a concept or sign understood throughout the legal community. 47 But the parameters of semiotics do not end there. As Professor Jack Balkin writes, "[t]he legal semiotician seeks to identify what might be called the 'grammar' of legal discourse-the acceptable moves available in the language game of legal discourse. These may occur at the level of permissible argument forms, modes of factual characterization, categories of social perception, or in many other ways."
48 Perhaps the 1. All communication is a process of exchange of meaningful signs, and signs and sign systems such as natural language mediate between communicating persons and those objects in the phenomenal, physical world of experience to which they refer.
2. All human societies have developed complex systems of both verbal and nonverbal sign systems which are not static but which evolve continuously to correspond with and to represent changing social norms and the evolving, growing social consciousness of any given community.
KEVELSON, supra, at 4 (commenting on Charles S. Peirce's theory). "To these major underlying assumptions I would add a third, namely, that . . . the entire notion of a legal system, consisting of interrelating communicative processes between legal discourse and legal practice, functions almost universally as a model of dialogic thought development." Id.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the possible variances of semiotic theory as they relate to legal citation. Peirce's second assumption, above, concurs with semiologist Ferdinand de Saussure's belief that signs are defined by their interaction in a system of signification such as language. 
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49
Following certain conventions-which, for the purpose of this inquiry into legal citation, may be summarized as "citation practice"-semioticians organize signs into meaningful systems known as codes.
50
Discovering or interpreting the "preferred meaning" of cf. as a signifier requires review of these codes.
At the outset, one might question whether ascertaining the cf. signal's firm, "preferred meaning" actually benefits the legal system. Although the rule of law should theoretically remain constant, in actuality particular laws frequently change, demonstrating that signs are malleable. "Law . . . may be many things, but it is not a static, determinate, or self-contained system for deriving predetermined, absolute, 'correct' answers to difficult questions."
51 Introductory signals aid this transformation as law is characterized, applied, and later recharacterized through citation.
52 Indeed, the meaning of contested political and social signs such as "federalism," "feminism," or "states' rights" can and arguably should drift: 53 [I]f the rules for interpretation and discovery are said to be a part of any given system of law which they govern, then it must be conceded that the system of law, as a whole, is unstable and that this instability is desirable. What should be apparent here is that legal reasoning, from the realists' point of view, if it is faithful to its pragmatic 49 ' [o]ur Constitution is color-blind,' had a progressive (and even radical) force in 1896 that becomes completely transformed by 1989, when it is offered by Justice Antonin Scalia as a justification for the unconstitutionality of affirmative action programs") (citations omitted).
53. See discussion infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. Once an author recognizes Bluebook niceties-i.e., understands when meanings can shift-then the author is wellequipped to decide whether contested legal signs should shift. That is, once the "rules" are understood, it is then more justifiable for an author to deviate from them.
ground, must violate the traditional laws of contradiction, that is, a legal system in the process of Becoming rather than one which is at least, ideally, existent and in place. 54 Most signs, if they were ships, could float rudderless. The cf. signal, however-as a device of legal discourse-is at present not seaworthy. There is too little agreement concerning its meaning, which negates its value as a sign.
55
Of course, unexplained cf. citations provide judges with the flexibility to refine and adapt legal doctrines to the exigencies of justice in particular cases. But predictability in the law is integral to individual justice and the legitimacy of our legal system. The smallest moves in the "language game of legal discourse" 56 should not be the most consequential. The guideposts for legal analogy should not be set in shifting foundational sands.
It is said that "not even the Emperor Augustus could effectively mandate the meaning of a word."
57 Nonetheless, some effort should be made to lend clarity to legal discourse where it is possible. Authors cannot control their words once they are set upon the page or upon a public digital medium, but readers should be able to distinguish concepts that authors wish to leave ambiguous from those that represent considered thought. With this goal in mind, this Article turns to review judicial interpretation of the cf. signal, in order to advance a pragmatic recommendation 58 to reform the rules of citation.
54. Kevelson, supra note 46, at 362. 55. See KEVELSON, supra note 47, at 5-6. That the meaning of a sign is based on the mutual agreement between users of the sign is one of Peirce's major assumptions. Signs designate aspects of the real world through contractual action . . . . Thus to speak of a fact is to speak of a community of qualitative likenesses and differences . . . .
Id.
On the other hand, cf.'s ambiguity may heighten readers' skepticism regarding the use of the signal to revise or even ignore authorities, which ultimately serves the semiotic goal of exposing ideologies, "mak [ing] Considerable disagreement surrounds the question of whether semiotics is a prescriptive or merely descriptive field. On one side of the controversy, it is argued that "legal semiotics is useful because it will allow us to clarify hidden tensions in the law and assist us in the continuing refinement of our moral and legal intuitions." Balkin, Promise, supra note 48, at 1836; see also Paul, supra note 44, at 1807 & n.76. Duncan Kennedy's work in constructing categories of legal argumentation has been described as legal semiotics because he "emphasized the ways in which legal concepts draw meaning from their place within broader reveals that, like their counterparts before the bar, the legal writers on the bench use and interpret cf. citations in an unpredictable, inconsistent, and occasionally outright contradictory fashion. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that law clerks typically draft initial opinions and judges review those drafts. But judges do not often pick over draft opinions to check marginal signals. Thus, a sloppy signal system permits law clerks to make (or unmake) law in ways that we do not even notice. This Part explains the creative dilemma posed by the cf. signal, reviews the spectrum of meanings that legal writers have ascribed to the signal, and illustrates the cf.'s hidden communicative possibilities.
A. Analogical Reasoning with "Cipher" Signals
Strangely, although analogical thinking is highly valued as a skill in the practice of law, the word "analogy" often appears in the case reports alongside "inapposite," "speculative," and other pejorative words and phrases from the legal lexicon. 60 In no place is this disapprobation more apparent than in judicial decisions construing the cf. The translation of arguably dissimilar principles and facts into new circumstances seems integral to the production of law, but it apparently ceases to influence some courts when preceded by the cf. signal, becoming mere analogy. 64 Perhaps analogical reasoning elicits such disapproval because judges must spend their days employing it. 65 63. Stafford, 164 S.E.2d at 376 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Although not cited in the opinion, the language appears to track that of The Bluebook. See, e.g., BLUEBOOK ELEVEN, supra note 33, Rule 1.2(a) (containing identical language ("sufficiently analogous to lend some support to its statement") to that of the court); BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a) (same except for the deletion of the word "some"). The result of this intensely creative enterprise is that, as often as not, cf. analogies are misunderstood. If the author of the citation has a later opportunity to explain, 66 then the original analogy might be recovered, but only after considerable confusion or a proliferation of unintended consequences.
Earnest judges wander in literally every direction seeking the elusive meaning of cryptic cf. citations. In the bulk of cases, courts follow the definitions set out in successive editions of The Bluebook 67 and attempt to construct analogies that represent positive authority for the proposition offered. 68 In some situations, however, courts use the cf. to construct analogies that damage the suggested conclusion, failing to recognize the original author's motivation as well as the substance of his or her analogy. Some courts essentially ignore relevant cases 69 1963) . Townsend involved a defendant petitioning for habeas corpus relief because his confession, which was admitted into evidence at trial, had been procured through the use of a truth serum. The Court ruled that the standard for when a habeas court should grant an evidentiary hearing to a petitioner is where facts are in dispute and the defendant "did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing" at trial. Id. at 312. The opinion listed six circumstances in which a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing. See id. at 313. It is most likely that this is the discussion in Townsend to which the Stone Court referred.
80. See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 836-40 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (finding that the defendant had the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his claim, but failed to raise it). The Gates court concluded that Stone and Townsend did not completely define the "full and fair hearing" required by the Fourth Amendment:
While we are not fully appreciative of the significance of the footnoted reference, we are persuaded that it cannot be reasonably interpreted to require a federal court to conduct a hearing on an issue where the state prisoner, having an opportunity to do so, never tendered the question to the state court. Such a proposition would totally undercut the thrust and rationale of Stone. Predictability of the law suffers because an author can no longer control how the reader perceives an idea once it is committed to paper. Unexplained cf. citations such as Stone's notorious footnote thirty-six exacerbate this problem and drain judicial resources on a significant scale because authors so often fail clearly to express their ideas in words, forcing the reader into an exhausting search for meaning. Some of the time-consuming analogical constructions done by the lower courts in the aftermath of Stone could have been avoided if the Court had seen fit to reference Townsend with a parenthetical phrase-as The Bluebook now strongly recommends for all citations beginning with cf.-explaining why it cited Townsend, or even provided a pinpoint citation identifying the part of the decision that it wanted the reader interpreting Stone to apply. Instead, unexplained cf. usages like this force diligent judges to wander in search of-and wonder about-the meaning of these cryptic citations. The following subsections illustrate the spectrum of interpretations applied to ambiguous cf. citations in a host of lower court decisions. The 93 which struck down Wisconsin's prejudgment garnishment procedure because it violated due process. 94 After examining Sniadach and its progeny, the court expressed "grave doubts" about whether the procedures followed in Pennsylvania were constitutional. 95 But it decided that it was compelled to uphold the procedures based on two citations by the Supreme Court in Sniadach. The first citation, introduced by a cf. signal, identified Ownbey v. Morgan 96 as supporting the conclusion that prejudgment attachments may satisfy due process in "extraordinary situations."
97 Sniadach then used a see signal to cite McKay v. McInnes 98 for the proposition that prejudgment attachments may satisfy due process in general if not in every situation. 99 The Lebowitz court concluded that Sniadach "at least recognizes the vitality of Ownbey and McKay, even if it does not impliedly approve of them." 100 Thus, the court concluded that it was the parties, is not a security." . . . Thus, the Court's reference to Judge Wright's concurring opinion must be regarded as an approving one.
Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d at 938 n.14 (quoting Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 560 bound to uphold the Pennsylvania attachment procedures, even though it evidently felt that the Supreme Court might decide those cases differently if presented with the opportunity. Given the definition of the cf. signal-that it refers to authorities that "lend support" 101 -cases like Lebowitz are troublesome. If commentators are to ascribe valid meanings to introductory signals and the citations they select, surely using authorities prefaced by the cf. signal as positive authority to the point where it controls or dictates a result increases ambiguity and reduces the clarity of those decisions. Such use of the cf. imperils the quest for uniformity in interpretation and thwarts the goal of achieving predictable outcomes in similar cases.
Unclear Authority: Citation Under Weightless Conditions.
Another response to indecipherable cf. citations is to treat them as malleable, oblique allusions to other doctrines or judges. 102 Clearly there is some value in controlled or intentional ambiguity, which use of the cf. signal masks well. It permits judges to refrain from pronouncing too much law, especially in situations in which they anticipate unpredictable factual situations that may necessitate caseby-case analysis, or when dealing with controversies that implicate broad social disputes unripe for decision. The unexplained cf. citation introduces authority that permits the author to declaim that the opinion contains some statement on an issue, without drawing necessary (or even permissible) conclusions. 
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to eliminate intentional ambiguity, 113 however, this situation may be difficult to surmount. If judges are using the cf. signal to identify intentional ambiguities, then proscribing deliberate vagueness may be an inadequate solution because the author may want the issue to be resolved either at a later time or by a different court.
3. Dismissed as Distinguishable. In many cases, courts fail to reconcile seemingly contradictory laws and use the cf. signal as a wildcard, interpreting the cited case with whatever weight or significance they choose. Such behavior abnegates the author's intended meaning with prejudice, because The Bluebook identifies the cf. signal as a supporting signal that may be used when the authority is not directly on point. 114 The primary mechanism through which these courts interpret cf. references is to dismiss or discard the cited authority as distinguishable, either in the facts stated 115 or occasionally in the legal proposition cited.
116 Some decisions also 113. Intentional ambiguity is, indeed, the defining attribute of riddles:
The riddle is an arrangement of words by which is understood or suggested something that is not expressed; or else it is an ingenious and witty description of this unexpressed thing by means of qualities and general traits that can be attributed quite as well to other things having no likeness or analogy to the subject. In dissent, Justice Brennan rejected this proposition and the authority it used for support: The Court's analogy between the deterrent function of federal habeas and the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule . . . is unsound, for the purported analogy continues to beg the question of what conduct ought to be deterred. . . . Given the difference between the nature of police conduct at issue in Leon and judicial interpretation, the majority's proffered analogy is flawed. It ultimately does no more than borrow language from Leon, and . . . fails to justify the majority's decision to embrace a "reasonableness" test as the appropriate objective of state-court adjudication.
CHARLES T. SCOTT, PERSIAN AND ARABIC RIDDLES: A LANGUAGE-CENTERED APPROACH
Id. at 425-26 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (second emphasis added).
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THE Cf. CITATION 1071 opinion, In re Sealed Case, 139 that Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh had not explained the nature of an analogical argument:
The Independent Counsel cites three cases for the proposition that personal jurisdiction over the individual served with a subpoena is enough to compel him to produce documents belonging to companies he represents.
[He] introduces these cases with the signal "Cf., e.g." Here, however, even that notoriously enigmatic signal has been taxed beyond its limits. We view with profound disfavor the Independent Counsel's disingenuous attempt to enlist prior holdings in the service of doctrines they in no wise support.
140
Although it is impossible to know what motivates legal writers to construe the cf. as negative authority, at least two unsavory possibilities exist. First, courts may deliberately misunderstand the original argument and invent negative analogies in order to obscure an author's intended analogies. Second, courts may create weak positive analogies-analogical straw men-whose patent lack of persuasiveness contributes to courts' contradictory rulings. Needless to say, either insidious possibility subverts meaningful legal discourse. Likewise, because it is seen alternately as persuasive, unclear, 
Id.
This problem persists when litigants question cf. citations on appeal because courts can more easily articulate how they feel about a decision than why they feel that way. This argument fails because the Commission only cited Amoco Fabrics as "cf." authority . . . . A "cf." cite simply means that the cited case, while standing for a proposition different from the one stated, lends some support. The trustee does not attack the proposition for which the case was cited: only whether the case directly supports it. The Court finds that the case was sufficient as cited, and the Commission's decision was not rendered arbitrary and capricious as a result.
Id. at *3 n.2.
